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BOOK REVIEWS
views of various schools of thought in medicine, particularly those
fields that deal with the back and those fields which deal with the
head. Which schools will the particular member of the impartial
medical panel belong to in a given case? This would seem to present
a real issue with reference to testimony by impartial medical witnesses.
It has been urged by those who are opposed to the plan that the
jury would give greater credence to the impartial medical witness
than it would to an expert called by either of the parties. The report
replies by stating that where the impartial medical witness is called
upon to testify he may be questioned as to his conclusions and the
certainties thereof, as to his doubts and differences of medical opinion
in the area of the injuries involved, and he may be cross-examined
as any other witness. The concern expressed might better be resolved
upon the theory that a trial is a search for truth and not a game of
chance.
The report concludes that the use of impartial medical experts
in those cases in which there is a substantial controversy between the
parties as to the medical aspects of the case is sound both in principle
and in practice, and that it.makes a valued contribution to the correct
disposition of those controversies, and helps immeasurably toward the
fair settlement of cases. Moreover, it states that men of high pro-
fessional competence and standing in the medical profession are agree-
able to serve as panel members, whereas heretofore they had shied
away from contact with any situation which might require their ap-
pearance in court as a witness.
This book will be useful for the general practitioner and is recom-
mended as a possible source of assistance in evaluating comparable
injuries for settlement purposes.
CHARLES MARGETT.*
VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION.
By Thomas Reed Powell. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1956. Pp. XV, 229. $3.50.
It certainly was "a happy inspiration," as Mr. Freund says' in
his foreword, that led to the choice of T. R. Powell as Carpentier
Lecturer at Columbia in 1955, and thus to the publication of this book.
For Powell was pre-eminent in the history of the Republic among
logical critics of the work of the Supreme Court. This volume, more-
over, is typical of all his work-scattered in more than 200 articles in
* Member of the New York Bar.
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law reviews and impressed upon the minds of countless students. In
a sense, the lectures were an epilogue, though he could hardly have
had in mind that his earthly sojourn was so near to its end.
Powell's general characteristics were brilliance, logic and wit.
He overawed us, as students. Later, in personal and more convivial
relations, he was less awesome, but surely as direct and persuasive in
tracing his argument from premise to conclusion.
Powell's philosophic inspiration came from John Dewey, and his
jurislprudence from Holmes. From these he learned that it is hopeless
to seek abstract truth. It did not phase him, for he had an abstrac-
tion of his own-surely unrecognized by him-the practicalities of
each situation. He reports that he once asked Holmes ". . . why
counsel should not give up prating about national and local, uniformity
and diversity, and tell the Court that the law is free for a decision
either way, and then add: 'I propose to confine myself to practical
considerations why my way is wiser than my opponent's way,' ""
and that Holmes replied: "I wish to God they would." 2 This, of
course, depicts Holmes as agreeing to a complete pulverization of all
pretense of legal principles in constitutional law, and making of the
Court a legislative body, and of the advocates before it lobbyists
instead of lawyers.
He deals first with the origin of judicial review of legislation.
Noting the fact that the constitution does not provide for it, he at-
tributes its force to an evolutionary process; really started by Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison,$ and thence growing (like Topsy), [the
metaphor is his] ,4 fed by almost universal public acceptance. Many
liberal theologians who are impressed by Darwin seem to think that
God gave the universe its start in much the same way. But there is
evidence that Powell thinks that Marshall's first shove to judicial
review was better planned.
As a true pragmatist, Powell is not concerned with the ontologi-
cal problem of the origins of the power of the judiciary to void
legislation. While he admits that the power itself may well have been
usurped by the Court,5 he is content with it, since it has been sanc-
tioned by a century and a half of "sufficient national acquiescence." 6
Yet, he violently disputes Hamilton's argument that the power of the
Court depends on the will of the people. He says: "this mythical
will of the people is to me as fanciful as the notions of emanations
of concreteness from Olympus, Mount Sinai, or the Pythoness of
Delphi." 7 He adds: "I prefer the frankness of.Professor John W.
1P. 178.
2 Ibid.
35 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
SP. 3.
5 P. 20.6 Ibid.
7P. 15.
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Burgess who said in substance 'I do not hesitate to declare that our
form of government is the aristocracy of the robe, which I venture to
regard as the best form of aristocracy in the world.' "8
Powell sees no inconsistency between his admission that the
power of the Court over legislation exists only by virtue of "sufficient
national acquiescence," and the assertion that our government is an
"aristocracy of the robe." There are vast differences between the
traditional aristocracies and our Court. For one, the Court never
defends itself under attack. There have been many attacks on the
Court, and many proposals to curb its power both long before and
after the stillborn plan of F. D. Roosevelt. At the moment, bills are
pending in Congress, in reaction to the Court's segregation decision,
which seek to limit the scope of judicial review. But the power of
the Court has survived because-and only because-it has throughout
its history commanded "sufficient natiohal acquiescence." Nor was
this acquiescence imposed by force or fear as was the case in the older
aristocracies of England and France or the newer ones in Russia and
China. Moreover, in the case of the aristocracy of the robe, their
opponents content themselves with open argumentative criticism and
efforts to reform. Southern senators issue a manifesto which can be
weighed by the people; F. D. Roosevelt called the Court, horse and
buggy; T. Roosevelt raved and ranted at Holmes, and other presidents
have not withheld severe criticism of the Court. The legal process of
impeachment has been suggested by disappointed interests, but as far
as I know, no one has ever cried "off with their heads." These aris-
tocrats are in this respect unique. There have been no palace revolu-
tions, purges or suspicions of murder. In the main, the justices are
known for longevity, and no matter how young they are in the begin-
ning, they have nearly always become "the nine old men."
Having established the fact of judicial supremacy over legislation,
Powell turns to a description of how the justices have used this power.
Here, again, he is on solid and familiar ground. For he has but little
difficulty in showing that in the field of constitutional law, the Court
legislates and that no single principle or group of principles can be
discerned in the opinions of the Court. More important, the support
for the opinions cannot be found in the constitution itself. Where can
one find in the constitution any set of words which would require
that the guaranty of liberty means, liberty to work in a bakery more
than ten hours per day, or the liberty of women and children to work
for less than a minimum wage?
Yet, the justices pretend to be applying the text of the constitu-
tion and steadfastly refuse to admit that they are legislating. But
Powell, as have others before him, proves that at least in constitutional
law, the judges are in reality ignoring the text of the Constitution and
re-writing it from day to day to suit preconceived notions of govern-
8 Ibid.
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ment. Powell has no patience with judicial pretensions that they are
interpreting the text, and not legislating. He boldly says that such
statements are either "crooked or stupid." 9 He recognizes, of course,
that constitutional law is sui generis in this regard. He claims that
he ". . . suffered much in the process of trying to test particular de-
cisions by their consonance with assumed, so-called general principles,
and even more acutely by trying to test them by their consonance with
each other." 10 This acute suffering led to sin-a transgression of
the Tenth Commandment-as he complains: "the supposedly great
teachers of common law subjects were able to paint pretty pictures and
perfect geometric patterns. Why couldn't I do it in public law as they
did it in private law?" 1 Later, he at least partially takes this back
and subscribes to the famous Holmesean dictum, "the life of the law
has not been logic: it has-been experience." 12
The rest of the book is much more of the same; this time applied
to the judicial utilization of the commerce clause. These chapters
contain a detailed analysis of the growth of national power under judi-
cial gnidance; the relation between federal and state powers; the
limits-under the commerce clause--of, state police and taxing powers.
This part of the book should be reqpired reading and study for stu-
dents of constitutional law, but-not 'for the purpose of learning the
art of prognostication of judicial decisions. He does not subscribe to
any such possibility. In dealing, for example, with theq extent to which
states may regulate interstate commerce, he recounts that after his
students ". . . had searched in vain for a formula, I suggested that
one might safely say that the states may regulate commerce some, but
not too much." Is - And-later on, dealing with the limits of the state
taxing power, he tells of a suggestion he made to the Legislature of
Massachusetts (a suggestion he, himself, calls "pernickety"). In
order to make sure that the statute would be upheld, his suggestion
was that it be amended to read ". . . this tax, shall be imposed on the
net income properly allocated to Massachusetts, or on doing business
measured by -the net income, whichever may make any particular levy
more palatable to the Supreme Court of the -United States." 14
Thus, though the reader will not find any guides to decisions in
Powell's work, he will be impressed by the sheer mastery of the ma-
terial, the poniard thrusts to the jugular at each breach of logical
reasoning, the careful analysis of the process of growth. All this is
intellectualism at its best. The judicial decisions are indeed all grist
for his mill. They are, as he most adequately proves, hopelessly
irreconcilable, their reasoning is often fallacious, they do not even
9 P. 28.
10 P. 33.
11 Ibid.
12 P. 37.
is P. 178.
'14 P. 197.
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espouse consistent policies. In short, they are like statutes. In spite
of Powell's rejection of one decision after another, he asserts, with
some surprise in his tone, that ". . . on the whole it has created for
us a fairly well balanced constitutional federalism." 15 As to the
"intricacies and varieties in reasoning," 16 he dismisses them as merely
"... food for thought, and not a little food for lawyers." 17
Of course, it is from constitutional law that the enemies of
"perfect law" get their greatest comfort. For here, as Powell so force-
fully shows, there is as little adherence to established policies as there
is in the Statutes at Large. Of course, in interpreting the constitu-
tion, the judges legislate. Take, for example, the problem of taxation
by Congress of salaries of government employees or agencies. In
McCulloch v. Maryland 18 it was held that the power to tax is the
power to destroy, and that therefore the State of Maryland could not
tax a branch of the United States Bank. In Collector v. Day 9 the
immunity was extended to state officers. This immunity was some-
what limited in Helvering v. Gerhardt,20 and finally completely with-
drawn in Graves v. New York.2 1 It could hardly have been antici-
pated in 1819 that the army of state and federal employees would
expand so vastly by 1939, and that the taxation of their incomes would
present serious economic and fiscal problems that would require a new
approach. Natural law does not require that statutes remain un-
changed or unrepealed. Nor does it require that a legislating judi-
ciary should steadfastly adhere to a policy which has outgrown its
utility.
Of course, Powell is right: the Supreme Court in constitutional
matters is our third legislative house. That is why it is proper to
disagree not only with its conclusion-we do that in private law as
well-but also with its premises, both articulate and inarticulate. For
they are legislating ad hoc, in each case, and doing so "with sufficient
national acquiescence."
Mr. Powell's style, both here, as in his articles, deserves mention.
He packs tons into inadequate space. He quips, often brilliantly, and
often makes the simple seem hard. For example, he says:
Unwelcome common law and statutory interpretations admit of but slightly
delayed prospective change by legislation. The correction of judicial infelicities
in assuming constitutional negatives is much more difficult, whether by judicial
recantation or by constitutional amendment.=
This, of course, simply means that it is easier to amend a statute than
to amend the constitution, or to get the Court to reverse itself.
it P. 179.
le Ibid.
1 'Ibid.
'8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
1' 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
304 U.S. 405 (1938).
21 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
22 p. 14.
1956 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This type of utilitarian approach is entirely proper in studying
constitutional law. For here we are not dealing with law "properly
so called" except in the Austimian sense. The oft quoted remark of
John Chipman Gray who tried teaching constitutional law after a
lifetime concern with the Rule against Perpetuities, "this is not law-
this is politics" is the lesson from Powell's book and from his life.
Powell, therefore-for all his logic--commits a grave fallacy when he
uses these cases as a refutation of the eternal verities of natural
justice. To be sure, there is no ideal "Chancellor's Foot" by which
the principles of natural law can be measured. But few can be
found, even in these days, who are willing flatly to assert that the
unseen and unknown do not exist. Uncertainty is all that empirical
logic permits. Yet these devotees of empirical logic insist that our
conduct must be based on the assumption that non-existence of eternal
light is the basic 'premise. To men of faith, this premise seems futile
and unrewarding. More, much more is needed. The constitution,
as the Supreme Court has interpreted it, has put into the hands of the
Court a veto power on legislation. That power is, indeed, exercised
by the Court in a manner more akin to the legislative than the judicial
process. The decisions of the Court in this regard must be judged
by right reason, by the extent to which they approximate the moral
concepts that lie at the root of perfect law.
MAURICE FINKEE-STEIN.*
M
THE ORIGIN OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. An Essay in Catholic
Political Philosophy. By Gabriel Bowe, O.P. Fresno: Academy
Library Qild, 1955. Pp. 102. $2.00.
The problem of authority and how it is acquired is again proving
troublesome to contemporary jurists and political theorists. Only a
few weeks ago, the first meeting of the newly formed American Society
for Political and Legal Philosophy, held at Brookings, Institution in
Washington, devoted two days to listening to and discussing three
papers by Hannah Arendt, Charles Hendel, and Jerome Hall on vari-
ous aspects of the nature of authority. The questions that followed
the addresses indicated that, able though the papers were, the problem
presents many aspects still unsolved. Perhaps the current concern
with authority can be attributed to the juridical situation which arose
in connection with the Nuremberg trials, where the lawyers had to
work without precedents, procedural codes, criminal statutes, and
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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